Pre-election tensions: Why Trump is putting pressure on Ukraine again and who will be able to rein him in after the election

Déjà vu 2025: Witkoff’s return 

Over the past two months, Donald Trump’s position on a settlement to the Russia-Ukraine conflict has taken another dramatic turn, returning to the patterns that defined it for much of 2025. Trump is seeking to use the limited, but nonetheless substantial, US military assistance to Ukraine as leverage over Kyiv, while at the same time showing sympathy for the arguments put forward by the aggressor, Vladimir Putin, who continues to demand unilateral concessions and hopes to inflict critical damage on Ukraine this winter.

Trump’s U-turn seems all the more shocking given that the logic behind his administration’s actions and statements over the past six to seven months appeared to be heading in the opposite direction, towards a cautious escalation of pressure on Moscow. Seven and a half months elapsed between the visit to Russia by Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner on 5 September this year and their previous meeting with Putin on 22 January. This was the longest gap since Witkoff began making regular trips to Russia in February 2025. Following the outbreak of war in Iran, this channel of communication between the White House and the Kremlin was effectively frozen. In June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio categorically rejected Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s assertion that a settlement to the Russia-Ukraine conflict should be based on the understandings reached in Anchorage. No understanding had been reached, Rubio insisted, thereby returning the negotiating process to square one, where it had stood in the spring of 2025.

At the NATO summit in Ankara this summer, Trump unexpectedly backed the granting of a licence to Ukraine to manufacture Patriot interceptor missiles, and at the end of July discussed the matter again with Zelensky in Washington. Finally, CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow at the end of August was interpreted by sources close to him as a warning to Moscow that its position in the military conflict was weakening, as well as a caution against the Kremlin’s intentions to escalate the conflict in Europe. Taken together, these developments appeared to suggest that the Kremlin could no longer count on Trump’s goodwill.

However, just a week after Ratcliffe’s return, Trump sent Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow. They have generally served as a channel for conveying the Kremlin’s proposals and perspective in the negotiations. The limited public information about the visit offered no indication of any revised formula for a peace agreement or any change in Moscow’s position. Nevertheless, following their return on 8 September, Trump called Putin, and, in a scene reminiscent of 2025, announced that they had had an ‘excellent conversation’, that Putin ‘wants to strike a deal’, and that the main obstacle was simply the mutual animosity between the Russian president and Volodymyr Zelensky.

Finally, on 13 September, Trump publicly demanded for the first time that Zelensky halt strikes on Russian oil refineries, claiming that they were causing a global diesel shortage and ‘harming the whole world’. During a telephone conversation with Zelensky on 20 September, Trump again, according to a senior Ukrainian official, repeatedly demanded that strikes on Russian oil refineries be halted, linking them to rising diesel prices. However, a day later, following a face-to-face meeting with Trump, Zelensky presented the initiative under discussion as a mutual energy truce between Russia and Ukraine, rather than a unilateral cessation of strikes, and emphasised that Kyiv was prepared only to accept such a format for halting the attacks.

When ‘the air smells of kerosene’

The fact that diesel suddenly became a prominent issue in US-Ukraine relations in mid-September was no coincidence. September saw a dual turning point in the run-up to the US midterm elections. On the one hand, diesel prices in the US crossed the psychological threshold of $6 per gallon; on the other, assessments of the likely electoral outcome for Republicans deteriorated sharply. Prediction market prices on Polymarket and Kalshi indicate that the party now faces the prospect of losing its majority not only in the House of Representatives but also in the Senate (Figures 1 and 2).

Unlike foreign policy, economic issues and the cost of living play a decisive role in shaping the mood of American voters, according to the near-consensus view among US experts and polling data. In this case, however, the question of responsibility for rising diesel prices in the US draws foreign policy into the sphere of pressing domestic concerns, making it part of the pre-election debate. Public pressure on Zelensky to stop strikes against Russia’s oil refining industry was intended to shift responsibility for rising prices away from Trump’s unpopular war in Iran and towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Kyiv’s actions.

Figure 1. Petrol and diesel prices in the US, June–October 2026, USD per gallon

Figure 2. Trump’s approval rating, odds on the Democrats controlling both houses of Congress, June–October 2026, %

Trump’s assertion that Ukraine is responsible for rising prices in the US is, of course, untrue, although it is not entirely without foundation. The divergence between petrol and diesel prices on the US market has been noticeable since July and continues to widen. As early as mid-summer, the International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that the recovery in oil exports from the Persian Gulf was outpacing the recovery in diesel refining, while Russia’s ban on diesel exports, introduced on 8 July following Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, further exacerbated the situation. The US remained an exporter of diesel, but unlike Russia and China, it did not impose restrictions on exports despite the emerging shortage. As a result, American diesel replaced Russian diesel in Latin American markets, according to S&P Global reports. In September, market conditions deteriorated further as a result of fresh Iranian attacks on Middle Eastern oil refining infrastructure. Exports of refined petroleum products from the region recovered to just 1.9 million barrels per day, compared with 4.7 million before the war, while wholesale diesel prices in Europe and the US reached record levels of around $220 per barrel, according to the IEA. Meanwhile, Donald Trump once again rejected the idea of restricting US exports.

Be that as it may, after Russia categorically rejected the proposal of an energy truce, and Zelensky rejected a unilateral cessation of strikes on Russian refineries, in the last ten days of September, Putin’s representative Kirill Dmitriev held talks in Washington on supplies of Russian diesel to the US market. The outcome was the diesel deal between Trump and Putin, which is unlikely to have a significant impact on prices in the US but allows the American president to present himself as a staunch defender of American consumers’ interests.

The issue is not simply that, in the public debate, the link between rising domestic prices and the war in Iran was subsequently displaced by Trump’s sensational accusations against Ukraine. Attacks on Trump by Democrats and European leaders over his deal with Putin only reinforce his image as a defender of ordinary Americans in the eyes of his loyal supporters and far-right voters. According to a YouGov poll conducted on 19-20 October, ten days after the diesel deal was announced, only 11% of Democrats agreed with Trump’s claim that Ukraine was responsible for rising prices, compared with nearly 75% of MAGA voters. Conversely, 72% of Democrats and 12% of MAGA voters disagreed (Figure 3).

This kind of public confrontation is part of the polarisation strategy Trump frequently employs, designed to boost mobilisation among his supporters and the MAGA electorate ahead of the vote. The low level of Republican voter engagement, identified in Pew Research Centre surveys conducted in late September and early October, is one factor contributing to the growing Democratic lead in the race. Among Democrats, 63% are highly motivated to vote, compared with just 46% of Republicans. Amy Walter, editor-in-chief of the Cook Political Report, describes this phenomenon as negative partisanship, which leads voters to set aside their grievances against the government, even over pressing issues such as the cost of living, and vote primarily to prevent their political opponents from winning.

Figure 3. Agreement with Trump’s criticism of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, October 2026, % of those surveyed

From the petrol pump to a ‘new Yalta’?

Many commentators and analysts in the US agree that the attacks on Zelensky over the strikes on Russian oil refineries and the diesel deal with Putin are intended to reverse the downward trend in Trump’s approval ratings, which are dragging down the Republicans’ overall election prospects (Volodymyr Zelensky made it clear at a press conference in Brussels on 16 October that he sees the situation in much the same way). Some, however, warn that those supporting aid to Ukraine could be making a serious mistake by assuming that Trump’s unexpected shift is purely electoral. If his pro-Moscow turn proves to be part of a broader policy agenda rather than a short-term electoral manoeuvre, the implications could be much more far-reaching.

Indeed, whilst the diesel deal in early October appeared to be purely a political manoeuvre, subsequent initiatives by the pro-Moscow wing of the Trump administration represent an attempt, building on its success, to formulate a comprehensive peace plan. Throughout October, Witkoff discussed this plan with representatives of Ukraine and the European coalition supporting it, first in Florida and then in Oslo, before bringing it to Moscow. However, the key elements and sticking points of the new plan are familiar from previous rounds of peace initiatives involving Witkoff and Dmitriev: Russia’s demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of Donbas, which Kyiv finds unacceptable; US security guarantees that Trump is unwilling to provide; vague plans for Ukraine’s future reconstruction that make no mention of Russian assets; and proposals to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe under US auspices, without agreement from European institutions or governments. At any rate, nothing in the details made public so far suggests any new thinking. The grand economic cooperation projects that typically accompany Witkoff and Trump’s peace initiatives are unlikely to elicit anything more than a smile under present circumstances.

At the same time, neither Moscow nor, previously, the participants in the Oslo talks rejected the plan outright. Moscow promised to return to substantive negotiations after the midterm elections. In their comments on Witkoff’s visit, however, both Ushakov and Putin himself emphasised that the negotiations Russia was prepared to begin in November should focus on establishing a ‘security system for Russia and Ukraine after the end of the conflict’ and the ‘architecture of European security as a whole’. In Kremlin parlance, this means, first, restricting the Ukrainian army’s defensive capabilities and, second, weakening security on NATO’s eastern flank. The fact that Moscow has raised these subjects, which are plainly unacceptable to Kyiv and its European allies, suggests that it does not regard the current plan as a genuine basis for negotiations, despite its conspicuously ‘friendly’ rhetoric towards Witkoff and Trump.

It seems highly likely that Ukraine’s European allies, Moscow and Kyiv are merely going through the motions of a negotiation process, allowing Trump to once again present himself as a ‘peacemaker’ just as he did last year during the climax of the election campaign. However, The Atlantic, citing an unnamed ‘presidential adviser’, claims that Donald Trump does genuinely harbour hopes of securing a framework peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv by the end of the year. He reportedly even sees himself standing between Putin and Zelensky at the G20 summit in Miami in mid-December. Though this scenario may be attractive, it is difficult to believe that, after a year and a half of fruitless negotiating back-and-forth, Trump sincerely expects a sudden breakthrough within the next six weeks. It seems more likely that the negotiations serve a practical purpose and are being used to pursue other objectives, whether electoral or related to Russia’s relations with Iran (→ Re:Russia: Where The Tracks Cross). Nevertheless, pressure on Ukraine is likely to continue over the coming month. In any case, these highly publicised ‘peace efforts’ will allow Trump to shift the blame onto Zelensky if the situation in Ukraine deteriorates sharply this winter, absolving his own administration, which is delaying critically needed military assistance to Ukraine under various pretexts, even where the assistance has already been agreed.

As for the proposed trilateral meeting on Ukraine involving Putin, Trump and Xi Jinping, this remains primarily a Russian initiative, unsupported by either Washington or Beijing. Ushakov first raised the possibility of such a meeting on 1 September, following talks between Putin and Xi in Bishkek. Over the following weeks, Russian foreign policy spokespeople returned to the subject several times, whilst representatives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry consistently replied that they had no information regarding such a plan. According to the Wall Street Journal, Putin proposed a trilateral meeting as a means of resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict during a telephone conversation with Trump on 9 October, held in connection with the diesel deal. However, Trump subsequently remarked that if such a meeting were to take place, its principal focus should be nuclear weapons rather than Ukraine. This is consistent with Washington’s longstanding calls for trilateral nuclear negotiations, although Beijing has consistently rejected that format. In China, no comment has yet been made regarding the prospects of a trilateral meeting. A ‘New Yalta’, therefore, currently exists only in the Kremlin’s imagination.

What Trump may and may not do wrong after the election

What might and might not Trump’s policy towards Ukraine look like after the mid-term elections? Even if the Democrats gain control of both chambers of Congress, two factors must be borne in mind. First, the new Congress will not take office until after the New Year. Second, Congress’s ability to influence the White House’s foreign policy is limited. Legislative action would require a supermajority sufficient to overcome both the filibuster and a presidential veto.

The Atlantic magazine and a number of other commentators consider the next two months to be the most dangerous period for Ukraine, as the new Congress will not yet have taken office. Even thereafter, however, Democratic control of both chambers, if achieved, would allow the party to exert pressure on the president’s foreign policy primarily through indirect means, including investigations, negotiations over appointments, and the blocking of defence budgets and appropriations. The administration’s freedom to pursue unconventional foreign policy initiatives would be constrained, but the Democrats would not be able to impose their own agenda on the White House.

However, the prospect of a supermajority capable of overriding a presidential veto does not seem inconceivable, whether in relation to certain forms of aid to Ukraine or to particularly controversial Trump ‘deals’ with the Kremlin. Such an outcome is possible in principle because there is significant Republican opposition to Trump’s Ukraine policy, which became apparent, in particular, during the debate on the Lindsey Graham bill. This creates scope for Republicans to join Democrats in responding to the administration’s pro-Kremlin moves. Several bipartisan initiatives in this area have already been proposed, including a bill targeting the diesel deal. Following what appears likely to be a Republican defeat in the midterm elections, and with Trump becoming a ‘lame duck’, bipartisan resistance to his pro-Kremlin tilt could become more consistent and widespread among Republicans.

A constraint on both sides, limiting both Trump’s excessively pro-Kremlin initiatives and hopes for a pro-Ukraine shift in Congress, is the particular combination of isolationism and hostility towards Putin’s Russia that characterises not only American society as a whole but also the Republican electorate. As the previously cited October YouGov poll shows, negative views of Putin’s Russia enjoy something approaching a consensus across American society. Only 5% of Democrats, 10% of independents and 15% of MAGA voters regard Russia as a friendly country or ally. Conversely, 83% of Democrats and 74% of MAGA supporters consider it an enemy or an unfriendly country, a gap of just 10 percentage points. Views of Ukraine are somewhat more divergent, with a gap of around 20 percentage points between Democrats and MAGA voters. Some 77% of Democrats and 54% of MAGA voters regard Ukraine as a friendly country. Yet here, too, there is little basis for the kind of polarisation Trump might seek to exploit. More than 80% of Democrats and 50% of MAGA voters sympathise with Ukraine, while only 1% and 5%, respectively, express sympathy for Russia (Figure 4). This points to an important constraint: a Ukrainian defeat in the war with Russia would be a major shock to the United States and a devastating blow to the reputation of the president who allowed it to happen.

Figure 4. Sympathies of US voters by party affiliation regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict, October 2026, % of those surveyed

At the same time, the issue of aid to Ukraine, its cost and the implications for American interests imposes a constraint from the opposite direction. As Figure 5 shows, support for providing military assistance to Ukraine commands only a relative majority in American society, at 46% compared with 34% opposed. Among Republicans, just 28% support providing military aid, and among MAGA voters the figure is only a quarter. There is considerably broader agreement, however, on sharing intelligence with Ukraine. More than a third of Republicans and MAGA voters oppose cutting Ukraine off from intelligence, and are also likely to oppose restrictions on Starlink services. This helps explain why, over the past two weeks, US officials have been unable to identify who is responsible for the disruption of communications used by the Ukrainian military. While blaming Zelensky for rising diesel prices in the US is more likely to mobilise Republican voters by signalling that the country’s economic interests take precedence over geopolitical considerations, evidence of covert assistance by the Trump administration to the Kremlin is more likely to provoke opposition from at least a significant proportion of them.

Figure 5. Support for providing military aid to Ukraine by party affiliation, October 2026, % of those surveyed

Figure 6. Support for providing Ukraine with intelligence, October 2026, % of those surveyed

Following the loss of a majority in even one of the chambers, this constraint will become a more serious problem for the Trump administration, as Democrats will gain the ability to launch formal investigations into such cases, summon witnesses and request documents.

Overall, it seems fair to say that Trump has already reduced the level of US assistance to Ukraine to the point where any further cuts would meet with disapproval from a substantial proportion of his core supporters. Even if, as some commentators fear, he feels less constrained by voters once he becomes a ‘lame duck’, electoral considerations will remain relevant for Republican members of Congress. This will encourage them to oppose Trump’s pro-Russian initiatives through bipartisan action.

Whilst Trump’s sudden new shift towards Moscow poses serious risks for Ukraine at a particularly critical moment, his administration’s room for manoeuvre on this front is likely to narrow following the expected defeat in the midterm elections. The key factor, however, will not be Democratic control of the chambers in and of itself, but rather the trajectory of public opinion, including among Republican voters, and, consequently, the number of Republicans willing to work with Democrats to curb the most egregious manifestations of the White House’s pro-Kremlin course.